By François-Xavier-Eric Dudouet Grémont, political sociology and morality, a researcher at the CNRS (Université Paris-Dauphine IRISSO) , chairman of the Observatory politico-economic structures of capitalism (OpesC) Specialist business economics, The financial crisis has made it more lively and pervasively some public controversy the role and place of bosses in Western societies. Curiously, if the question of their responsibility for the disaster was quickly removed from public debate, it focused on a point seemingly innocuous pay. As if the debate was over the basics - to the accessory. Certainly, in general terms, some heads rolled at the top of large companies; indeed everywhere, politicians, journalists, academics and even some players have called for an overhaul of the international financial system and payment methods. Yet if one lies in the fact, government intervention has so far avoided the overhaul of the system or discharge to the liberal way. If the viability of a private financial system, its own laws had condemned without appeal, was the focus of public interventions, it is reasonable to ask whether the implicit aim was not exactly the conservation of economic elites saved timely bankruptcy, along with the businesses they run. The question of the crisis and its treatment by the States must leave the field for purely economic gain that of political sociology to to ask: state intervention Has not had more effect ultimately save some business elite as clear a system in crisis? More surprising still, why the issue of pay continues Does float while that, fundamentally, the responsibility has been retracted?
To answer these questions, at least for France, we propose to observe the changes that took place at the head of the CAC 40 since the summer of 2007 (when the bubble burst called subprime) and compare them with the sociological characteristics the great French masters. Thus, we will be able to better measure the effects of the crisis on this population. Finally, we try to show that the controversy over remunerations reveal disturbances especially the organization of our societies wage.
sociography major French employers during the 2000s in France, as in most developed countries, CEOs are less often owners and managers increasingly, is to professionals say business leadership position who owe less to their economic capital and other types of resources such as career path, the portfolio of relationships or educational background. The figure of "director", as Berle and Means identified as early as 1930 1, has steadily increased during the twentieth century to become the dominant type of corporate CEOs. In 1981, the numbers 1 first 40 caps from the Paris Bourse, Bauer and Bertin-Mourot two managers were 57% against 43% ownership patterns, the proportion reaching 55% against 45% in 1986 on top of nationalizations 3. And that's not counting the public, where by definition all bosses are managers not owners. If we integrate the public sector is therefore the vast majority of pundits who, in the 1980s, are managers. Privatization will, in fact, confirm this trend, since the proportion of managers among the numbers 1 to 40 listed companies on the GAG from 77% in 1991 to 80% in 1997 and even 85% in 2002, counting patterns étrangers4 . This changing pattern types in the CAC 40 pound two lessons. On the one hand that the family capitalism has not benefited from privatization to increase and even maintain its position within larger companies. On the other hand that the bosses of state " overwhelmingly successful in their conversion deprived the nobility of State has turned into business aristocracy. What about for 2000? The mythical figure of the chief executive officer (CEO), who was especially popular between 1950 and 1990 5, is declining in early 2000: CEO 27 for 51 against 17 companies in 2002 to 47 in 2008. The dual capacity of Chairman of the Board and CEO embodies the CEO is increasingly rare in recent years in favor of the governorships two-headed, especially with the Supervisory Board and Executive Board 6 The Rise This formula leads therefore to develop a broader vision of the big bosses alike including CEOs, board chairs, CEOs, presidents of the board and managers for companies limited by shares. With this definition, we obtain a population of 136 patterns for companies listed on the CAC 40 between 2002 and 2008. An examination of nationality shows a significant proportion of foreigners (17%). This is a significant change compared to the years 1980-1990, where foreign employers, as Lindsay Owen-Jones at L'Oreal, were rare. However, this development does not suggest a clear opening and massive French groups. In one case (Lakshmi Mittal Arcelor Mittal), the assumption was made following a hostile takeover that made headlines. But more often, there are foreign bosses in the head of the CAC40 companies because of the large transnational mergers in the late 1990s and the 2000s Aventis, EADS, Dexia, Arcelor, Alcatel-Lucent, Unibail -Rodamco. In a few cases are exceptions, however: Lindsay Owen-rods at L'Oreal, Jose-Luis Duran Carrefour, Ben Vervaayen Alcatel-Lucent or Chris Viehbacher Sanofi Aventis. Women are large absent. We counted only three during the period 2002-2008 Elisabeth Badinter, Chair of the Supervisory Board of Publicis since 1996, Patricia Barbizet, President of the Supervisory Board of PPR between 2001 and 2005, Patricia Russo, CEO Alcatel Lucent from 2006 to 2008. If we analyze now the educational capital of the big bosses, the vast majority of tertiary education (126 of 136) 7.Parmi the ten remaining three have a baccalaureate level or below and seventeen were not informed. These are academic degrees that occur most often (31% of bosses are holding a university degree), but the hegemony of the university is misleading. They are only 23 to be only holders of university degrees, the majority of foreigners (14 to 9 French). Among the 40 French managers who experienced the benches of the university, 31 had attended at least one other training, which very often a great school. Unlike most other countries, university degrees are still poorly valued by economic elites, benefiting from the training offered by schools. In fact, of 113 French managers, 87 have gone through a great école8, or 77% of the workforce. However, if we distinguish among the French, the "owners" of managers, while the proportion drops to 62% for the former and is 80% for the latter. This dichotomy shows that economic capital continues to play as full legitimate resource for leading a large group, and if in the educational capital is an indispensable resource for French managers penniless. But two schools in particular stand out very clearly from all: Polytechnique and Ecole Nationale d'Administration. They provide more than half of French managers (42% of all French bosses). This hegemony is to be linked to the main body of the Etat9 which these schools are the main providers. Patterns from these great bodies represent 30% of managers and 26% of all French bosses, with a special bonus for the inspection of Finance, a strong presence in banking and insurance, and the body of Mines, more prevalent in the industry. Business schools, which were hardly seen in the past 10, seems to be booming in the early 2000s, 24% of French bosses come from HEC, ESSEC and the Ecole Superieure de Commerce Paris, but only 18% if we subtract those who add a passage by the ENA. After this brief overview of the social characteristics of the leaders of GAG 40, we can draw several important lessons. Educational capital of the great French masters continues to be largely structured by the system of large schools and large bodies of the state. However, we note the rise of foreign employers and graduates of business schools, which become more and more portions of this significant population. But the crisis she had a large effect on these sociological trends? Observe changes in the head major French companies since the bubble burst subprime in August 2007.
To answer these questions, at least for France, we propose to observe the changes that took place at the head of the CAC 40 since the summer of 2007 (when the bubble burst called subprime) and compare them with the sociological characteristics the great French masters. Thus, we will be able to better measure the effects of the crisis on this population. Finally, we try to show that the controversy over remunerations reveal disturbances especially the organization of our societies wage.
sociography major French employers during the 2000s in France, as in most developed countries, CEOs are less often owners and managers increasingly, is to professionals say business leadership position who owe less to their economic capital and other types of resources such as career path, the portfolio of relationships or educational background. The figure of "director", as Berle and Means identified as early as 1930 1, has steadily increased during the twentieth century to become the dominant type of corporate CEOs. In 1981, the numbers 1 first 40 caps from the Paris Bourse, Bauer and Bertin-Mourot two managers were 57% against 43% ownership patterns, the proportion reaching 55% against 45% in 1986 on top of nationalizations 3. And that's not counting the public, where by definition all bosses are managers not owners. If we integrate the public sector is therefore the vast majority of pundits who, in the 1980s, are managers. Privatization will, in fact, confirm this trend, since the proportion of managers among the numbers 1 to 40 listed companies on the GAG from 77% in 1991 to 80% in 1997 and even 85% in 2002, counting patterns étrangers4 . This changing pattern types in the CAC 40 pound two lessons. On the one hand that the family capitalism has not benefited from privatization to increase and even maintain its position within larger companies. On the other hand that the bosses of state " overwhelmingly successful in their conversion deprived the nobility of State has turned into business aristocracy. What about for 2000? The mythical figure of the chief executive officer (CEO), who was especially popular between 1950 and 1990 5, is declining in early 2000: CEO 27 for 51 against 17 companies in 2002 to 47 in 2008. The dual capacity of Chairman of the Board and CEO embodies the CEO is increasingly rare in recent years in favor of the governorships two-headed, especially with the Supervisory Board and Executive Board 6 The Rise This formula leads therefore to develop a broader vision of the big bosses alike including CEOs, board chairs, CEOs, presidents of the board and managers for companies limited by shares. With this definition, we obtain a population of 136 patterns for companies listed on the CAC 40 between 2002 and 2008. An examination of nationality shows a significant proportion of foreigners (17%). This is a significant change compared to the years 1980-1990, where foreign employers, as Lindsay Owen-Jones at L'Oreal, were rare. However, this development does not suggest a clear opening and massive French groups. In one case (Lakshmi Mittal Arcelor Mittal), the assumption was made following a hostile takeover that made headlines. But more often, there are foreign bosses in the head of the CAC40 companies because of the large transnational mergers in the late 1990s and the 2000s Aventis, EADS, Dexia, Arcelor, Alcatel-Lucent, Unibail -Rodamco. In a few cases are exceptions, however: Lindsay Owen-rods at L'Oreal, Jose-Luis Duran Carrefour, Ben Vervaayen Alcatel-Lucent or Chris Viehbacher Sanofi Aventis. Women are large absent. We counted only three during the period 2002-2008 Elisabeth Badinter, Chair of the Supervisory Board of Publicis since 1996, Patricia Barbizet, President of the Supervisory Board of PPR between 2001 and 2005, Patricia Russo, CEO Alcatel Lucent from 2006 to 2008. If we analyze now the educational capital of the big bosses, the vast majority of tertiary education (126 of 136) 7.Parmi the ten remaining three have a baccalaureate level or below and seventeen were not informed. These are academic degrees that occur most often (31% of bosses are holding a university degree), but the hegemony of the university is misleading. They are only 23 to be only holders of university degrees, the majority of foreigners (14 to 9 French). Among the 40 French managers who experienced the benches of the university, 31 had attended at least one other training, which very often a great school. Unlike most other countries, university degrees are still poorly valued by economic elites, benefiting from the training offered by schools. In fact, of 113 French managers, 87 have gone through a great école8, or 77% of the workforce. However, if we distinguish among the French, the "owners" of managers, while the proportion drops to 62% for the former and is 80% for the latter. This dichotomy shows that economic capital continues to play as full legitimate resource for leading a large group, and if in the educational capital is an indispensable resource for French managers penniless. But two schools in particular stand out very clearly from all: Polytechnique and Ecole Nationale d'Administration. They provide more than half of French managers (42% of all French bosses). This hegemony is to be linked to the main body of the Etat9 which these schools are the main providers. Patterns from these great bodies represent 30% of managers and 26% of all French bosses, with a special bonus for the inspection of Finance, a strong presence in banking and insurance, and the body of Mines, more prevalent in the industry. Business schools, which were hardly seen in the past 10, seems to be booming in the early 2000s, 24% of French bosses come from HEC, ESSEC and the Ecole Superieure de Commerce Paris, but only 18% if we subtract those who add a passage by the ENA. After this brief overview of the social characteristics of the leaders of GAG 40, we can draw several important lessons. Educational capital of the great French masters continues to be largely structured by the system of large schools and large bodies of the state. However, we note the rise of foreign employers and graduates of business schools, which become more and more portions of this significant population. But the crisis she had a large effect on these sociological trends? Observe changes in the head major French companies since the bubble burst subprime in August 2007.
The sustainability of business French Three types of change at the head of major French companies between summer 2007 and autumn 2009 are noteworthy. There is first of all bosses punished for problems prior to the crisis and found mainly in industry. Patterns of the banking system are in direct costs of the crisis. Finally, there are the normal succession in the head major groups that affect both finance and industry. The big bosses punished for their results, José Luis Duran (Carrefour ~ Patricia Russo and Serge Tchuruk (Alcatel), Gérard Le Fur (Sanofi-Aventis), Frank Dangeard (Thomson), were already on the spot. The crisis has at best, rather than accelerated the resignations expected. Revocations Christian Streiff (PSA) and François Morin (Veolia) in spring 2009 are for the industry, an almost direct consequence of the crisis. Both were at the head of automotive companies hit hard by the credit crunch. In banking, however, changes are clearly linked to the financial crisis Axel Miller and Pierre Richard (Dexia), Charles Milhaud (Savings) and Philippe Dupont (Banques Populaires). Their institutions were particularly vulnerable. The departure of Daniel Bouton of Societe Generale is more complex, as was done in two stages, first by leaving the executive management of the bank (May 2008), then the Chair of the Board (May 2009). Especially this departure was not presented as directly linked to the financial crisis, but the case Kerviel 11 (January 2008) and the media-political turmoil generated by stock options granted in March 2009 to bank executives. But far from deep recompose the French banking industry, these resignations have resulted in strengthening a national old atavism: the place to head banks of former finance inspectors. So it is with Pierre Mariani (Dexia), Frederic Oudéa (SocGen) and Perol (BPCE, which is the new group resulting from the merger of the Savings Banks and popular). If one adds BNP Paribas, led by two former inspectors, including the president and AXA managing directors, CEOs and future, is also seen that most of the French financial system is now headed by former inspectors (alone among the major banks, Crédit Agricole exception to the rule). In other business, the appointment of new management since August 2007 is the normal cycle of succession (Air France-KLM, AXA, EDF, Pernod-Ricard, Vallourec Veolia) or creation (Suez Environment). Among the new owners appointed during this period, there were: a pattern of family capitalism, but from a company, AXA, where he is not a significant shareholder and which he leaves the presidency in 2010, three foreigners, including three French graduate major foreign universities, two ENS, an engineer from the Corps des Mines, four of which Polytechnique Ecole des Mines, an engineer corps of Civil Engineering and the Aerospace, finally, four of which three inspectors énarques Finance and State Councilor. Note the lack of graduates from top business schools in this new promotion, except Proglio (HEC), appointed head of EDF, but that was already CEO of Veolia. The appointments have occurred since the beginning of the crisis have not substantially changed the social characteristics observed previously, increasing only the most salient features: the lack of women managers clear domination of employers, from large primary schools and large bodies, quasi-hegemony of financial inspectors in banking and insurance. If the crisis has caused casualties, it is individuals, not social structures that are remarkably resistant. The shock of international finance has therefore not currently leads to a questioning of the economic elites, on the contrary, see their most characteristic features become stronger. This observation matches the one made by the press about the large U.S. banks. If heads have fallen, the men remained the same, to the point where one wonders if the hundreds of billions of dollars spent by states have not been more effectively protect the business community than to clean up the financial system. Banks, both French and American, did they not eager to repay the states, just found the best days? Without doubt, as stated by the CEO of Goldman Sachs, to be free to resume their remuneration policy and thus extend the ecosystem financial community.
The issue of pay This is not a coincidence that the harshest criticism against bosses reflect their earnings. In France, this is not new. Since Philippe Jaffre, Elf, who left in 2000 with a golden parachute of 250 million francs, the compensation of top executives has continued to fuel the chronic. However, the question took on particular importance with the financial crisis, so that some bankers more or less spontaneously gave up their bonuses for fiscal 2008 (BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole), even in the main their remuneration (Daniel Bouton at Societe Generale). More importantly, solicited from all sides, the French bosses gave in the spring of 2009, wages in less formal self-regulation by creating the Committee of Wise Men, French Association of capitalism "managerial" capitalism on the family. This growth patterns managers, while not new, takes a completely different turn with the explosion of their pay, which abuts against the value system of a middle class in crisis. Scandals relating to the remuneration of top executives do ultimately underscore the difficulty in converting a legitimate professional capital into economic capital.
1. A. Berle, G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Public Property, NY, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1932. 2. M. Bauer, B. Bertin-Mourot, Directors and Officers of the CAC 40. Social logic of self-government in the heart of business, Puteaux, CNRS, Boyden, 1997. 3. We added the categories of state bosses 'and employers' corporate career "to form the group manager. 4. RX. Dudouet, USA. Grémont, "Great bosses and the State in France, 1981-2007," Companies contemporary, 68, 2007. 5. H. Joly, Managing a large French company in the twentieth century modes of governance, trajectory and recruitment, Unpublished paper submitted for accreditation to supervise research, EHESS, 2008. 6. It is possible that this tendency to dissociation is the expression of a widespread generational movement at the head of the CAC 40 companies and as temporary. 7. RX. Dudouet, USA. Grémont, Major patterns in France. Privatization to globalization, Paris, guide lines, 2010. 8. Most often the Ecole Normale Superieure, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, Polytechnique, Mines, Bridges, Central National School of Telecommunications, HEC, Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Paris, ESSEC, the European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD), Sciences-Po and Supelec) 9. Council of State, Court of Audit, Inspection Finance Corps des Mines, Ponts et Chaussées corps Telecoms. 10. P. Bourdieu and M. de Saint-Martin, "The Patronage", Proceedings of the Social Science Research, No. 20-21.1977; M, Bauer, B. Bertin-Mourot, op. cit. There. The name of the trader Jerome Kerviel, accused of having exposed the bank for a fraudulent $ 50 billion and led it to liquidate positions, with a loss of 5.5 billion euros in January 2008.
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